Ariel Rubinstein
Ariel Rubinstein | |
---|---|
![]() Ariel Rubinstein, 2007 | |
Born | (1951-04-13) April 13, 1951 (age 73) Jerusalem, Israel |
Academic career | |
Field | Game theory, bounded rationality, choice theory, behavioral economics |
Institution | Tel Aviv University New York University |
Alma mater | Hebrew University of Jerusalem |
Doctoral advisor | Menahem Yaari |
Awards | Israel Prize (2002) Nemmers Prize in Economics (2004) EMET Prize (2006) Rothschild Prize (2010) |
Information at IDEAS / RePEc | |
Ariel Rubinstein (Hebrew: אריאל רובינשטיין; born April 13, 1951) is an Israeli economist who works in economic theory, game theory and bounded rationality.
Biography
Ariel Rubinstein is a professor of economics at the School of Economics at Tel Aviv University and the Department of Economics at New York University. He studied mathematics and economics at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1972–1979 (B.Sc. Mathematics, Economics and Statistics, 1974; M.A. Economics, 1975; M.Sc Mathematics, 1976; Ph.D. Economics, 1979).
In 1982, he published "Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model",[1] an important contribution to the theory of bargaining. The model is known also as a Rubinstein bargaining model. It describes two-person bargaining as an extensive game with perfect information in which the players alternate offers. A key assumption is that the players are impatient. The main result gives conditions under which the game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium and characterizes this equilibrium.
Honours and awards
Rubinstein was elected a member of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities (1995),[2] a Foreign Honorary Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in (1994)[3] and the American Economic Association (1995). In 1985 he was elected a fellow of the Econometric Society,[4] and served as its president in 2004.[5]
In 2002, he was awarded an honorary doctorate by the Tilburg University.[6]
He has received the Bruno Prize (2000), the Israel Prize for economics (2002),[7][8] the Nemmers Prize in Economics (2004),[9][10] the EMET Prize (2006).[11] and the Rothschild Prize (2010).[12]
Published works
- Bargaining and Markets, with Martin J. Osborne, Academic Press 1990
- A Course in Game Theory, with Martin J. Osborne, MIT Press, 1994.
- Modeling Bounded Rationality, MIT Press, 1998.
- Economics and Language, Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- Lecture Notes in Microeconomic Theory: The Economic Agent, Princeton University Press, 2006.
- Economic Fables, Open Book Publishers, 2012.
- AGADOT HAKALKALA (heb.), Kineret, Zmora, Bitan, 2009.
See also
References
- ^ Rubinstein, Ariel (1982). "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model" (PDF). Econometrica. 50 (1): 97–109. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.295.1434. doi:10.2307/1912531. JSTOR 1912531. S2CID 14827857.
- ^ "Prof. Rubinstein Ariel Member Information (Election year 1995)". Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities. Retrieved 27 May 2013.
- ^ "Book of Members, 1780–2010: Chapter R" (PDF). American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Archived (PDF) from the original on 13 June 2011. Retrieved 3 June 2011.
- ^ Welcome to the website of The Econometric Society An International Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory in its Relation to Statistics and Mathematics Archived December 10, 2008, at the Wayback Machine
- ^ Welcome to the website of The Econometric Society An International Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory in its Relation to Statistics and Mathematics Archived October 6, 2006, at the Wayback Machine
- ^ "Tilburg University - Search results". Tilburg University.
- ^ "Israel Prize Official Site (in Hebrew) – Recipient's C.V."
- ^ "Israel Prize Official Site (in Hebrew) – Judges' Rationale for Grant to Recipient".
- ^ Nemmers Prizes, Awards, Office of the Provost, Northwestern University Archived September 12, 2006, at the Wayback Machine
- ^ "The Erwin Plein Nemmers Prize in Economics". Archived from the original on February 22, 2006.
- ^ "סיעוד". Archived from the original on 2007-03-11.
- ^ "Rothschild Prize".
External links
- Personal Web site
- Nash lecture
- Roberts, Russ (April 25, 2011). "Rubinstein on Game Theory and Behavioral Economics". EconTalk. Library of Economics and Liberty.
- v
- t
- e
- Congestion game
- Cooperative game
- Determinacy
- Escalation of commitment
- Extensive-form game
- First-player and second-player win
- Game complexity
- Graphical game
- Hierarchy of beliefs
- Information set
- Normal-form game
- Preference
- Sequential game
- Simultaneous game
- Simultaneous action selection
- Solved game
- Succinct game
- Mechanism design
concepts
- Bayes correlated equilibrium
- Bayesian Nash equilibrium
- Berge equilibrium
- Core
- Correlated equilibrium
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
- Epsilon-equilibrium
- Evolutionarily stable strategy
- Gibbs equilibrium
- Mertens-stable equilibrium
- Markov perfect equilibrium
- Nash equilibrium
- Pareto efficiency
- Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
- Proper equilibrium
- Quantal response equilibrium
- Quasi-perfect equilibrium
- Risk dominance
- Satisfaction equilibrium
- Self-confirming equilibrium
- Sequential equilibrium
- Shapley value
- Strong Nash equilibrium
- Subgame perfection
- Trembling hand equilibrium
of games
- Go
- Chess
- Infinite chess
- Checkers
- All-pay auction
- Prisoner's dilemma
- Gift-exchange game
- Optional prisoner's dilemma
- Traveler's dilemma
- Coordination game
- Chicken
- Centipede game
- Lewis signaling game
- Volunteer's dilemma
- Dollar auction
- Battle of the sexes
- Stag hunt
- Matching pennies
- Ultimatum game
- Electronic mail game
- Rock paper scissors
- Pirate game
- Dictator game
- Public goods game
- Blotto game
- War of attrition
- El Farol Bar problem
- Fair division
- Fair cake-cutting
- Bertrand competition
- Cournot competition
- Stackelberg competition
- Deadlock
- Diner's dilemma
- Guess 2/3 of the average
- Kuhn poker
- Nash bargaining game
- Induction puzzles
- Trust game
- Princess and monster game
- Rendezvous problem
- Aumann's agreement theorem
- Folk theorem
- Minimax theorem
- Nash's theorem
- Negamax theorem
- Purification theorem
- Revelation principle
- Sprague–Grundy theorem
- Zermelo's theorem
figures
- Albert W. Tucker
- Amos Tversky
- Antoine Augustin Cournot
- Ariel Rubinstein
- Claude Shannon
- Daniel Kahneman
- David K. Levine
- David M. Kreps
- Donald B. Gillies
- Drew Fudenberg
- Eric Maskin
- Harold W. Kuhn
- Herbert Simon
- Hervé Moulin
- John Conway
- Jean Tirole
- Jean-François Mertens
- Jennifer Tour Chayes
- John Harsanyi
- John Maynard Smith
- John Nash
- John von Neumann
- Kenneth Arrow
- Kenneth Binmore
- Leonid Hurwicz
- Lloyd Shapley
- Melvin Dresher
- Merrill M. Flood
- Olga Bondareva
- Oskar Morgenstern
- Paul Milgrom
- Peyton Young
- Reinhard Selten
- Robert Axelrod
- Robert Aumann
- Robert B. Wilson
- Roger Myerson
- Samuel Bowles
- Suzanne Scotchmer
- Thomas Schelling
- William Vickrey